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Open access under CC BY-NMost research about cooperative (coop) advertising programs in channels relies on the assumption that
manufacturers and retailers decide of pricing and marketing efforts simultaneously. This paper evaluates
this central assumption and investigates the optimal periodicity (sequence of move) of pricing and mar-
keting efforts (ME) decisions for a distribution channel. We develop a game theoretic model that accounts
for pricing at each level of the channel, for the manufacturer’s ME mix strategies (a direct ME to consum-
ers and coop advertising program offered to the retailer) and the retailer’s ME as well. We obtain solu-
tions for a bilateral channel under different vertical interaction scenarios; when the channel is led by
the manufacturer, the retailer or when channel members decide simultaneously of each of their market-
ing mix decisions (vertical Nash). We compare the effect of pricing and ME decision periodicity on out-
puts for each channel member. The main ﬁndings suggest that simultaneous decision-making of pricing
and ME is optimal only for high enough levels of the manufacturer’s ME effects. For very highly effective
marketing efforts, sequential play of pricing and ME allows channel members to implement equilibrium
strategies and achieve maximum proﬁts that would not be achieved with simultaneous decision-making.
This highlights the importance of relaxing the simultaneous play assumption of pricing and ME in a dis-
tribution channel.
 2013 Elsevier B.V. Open access under CC BY-NC-ND license.1. Introduction
Distribution channels invest a large percentage of their market-
ing budgets into a variety of non-price marketing efforts such as
merchandising activities, local advertising, displays and features
by the retailer and national advertising and direct consumer pro-
motions by the manufacturer (product sampling, trade fairs, etc.).
Cooperative (coop) advertising programs that aim at sharing the
costs of retail promotions also represent a signiﬁcant component
of the manufacturer’s promotional mix (Nagler, 2006).
A growing literature has studied the effects of such programs in
distribution channels and has shown their importance in coordi-
nating strategies and improving overall channel efﬁciency (Berger,
1972; Bergen and John, 1997; Jørgensen et al., 2000; Huang and Li,
2001; Li et al., 2002; Huang et al., 2002; Xie and Ai, 2006; Karray
and Zaccour, 2006, 2007; Yan, 2009; Ahmadi-Javid and Hosein-
pour, 2011; Kunter, 2012). The existing research about coop adver-
tising programs considering endogenous pricing decisions relies on
the assumption that each channel member decides simultaneously
of its pricing and marketing efforts (Karray and Zaccour, 2006,
2007; Yue et al., 2006; Xie and Wei, 2009; Szmerekovsky and
Zhang, 2009; He et al., 2009; Ahmadi-Javid and Hoseinpour,
2011; SeyedEsfahani et al., 2011; Kunter, 2012).C-ND license.However, some marketing scholars considered that marketing
efforts and prices are decided at different stages instead of simul-
taneously by each channel member and argued that this is due to
the discrepancy in the periodicity i.e., the timing and frequency of
these decisions (Agrawal, 1996; Banerjee and Bandyopadhyay,
2003; Parker and Soberman, 2006; Karray and Martin-Herran,
2008; Draganska et al., 2009). In these papers, the marketing effort
decision in the channel, namely advertising, has been assumed to
precede prices. This is based on the observation, in some indus-
tries, that advertising is usually set for a longer time period than
prices and therefore should be decided at an earlier stage, which
is especially the case for national advertising campaigns in tradi-
tional media outlets (TV, print, radio, etc.). Looking at a wider range
of marketing efforts, evidence from the practice of coop advertising
programs shows that prices can be decided more frequently than
coop advertising rates and promotional budgets, especially for fast
moving consumer products. In fact, the National Register Publish-
ing (NRP) for coop advertising programs provides examples of coop
advertising programs that are ﬁxed for the entire year while more
frequent price negotiations could occur during the year (NRP
source book sample, 2012).
Alternatively, marketing effort budgets could also be more fre-
quent decisions than prices. For example, manufacturers which
brands beneﬁt from high levels of consumer loyalty usually avoid
frequent price adjustments that could damage their brand image
(Raju et al., 1990). Pricing can also be a less frequent decision than
636 S. Karray / European Journal of Operational Research 228 (2013) 635–647marketing efforts in case the retailer is adopting a strategy of
everyday low pricing, and agrees with the manufacturer to ﬁx
wholesale prices in order to avoid uncertainty (Kopalle et al.,
1996). In such cases, marketing efforts could be more frequent
decisions than prices especially for non-price promotions that in-
form consumers about the product attributes, build store trafﬁc,
or provide additional in-store customer service (e.g., sales support,
merchandising activities, social media marketing activities, etc.).
Finally, some marketing efforts such as online advertising, local
advertising (e.g., in retail ﬂyers or local publications) and in-store
promotional activities (e.g., displays and features) that are decided
on on-going basis would not necessitate a long budget commit-
ment by the manufacturer and the retailer. For instance, the NRP
shows also cases of coop programs agreements that are decided
on on-going basis instead of ﬁxed for the entire year. These differ-
ent examples indicate that marketing efforts can be determined
more frequently than prices and therefore could succeed the pric-
ing decisions.
Empirically, the issue of periodicity of pricing and marketing ef-
fort (ME) has been described as an important yet unexplored factor
that considerably affects our understanding of these strategic deci-
sions (Kadiyali et al., 2001; Rao, 2009). As noted by Rao (2009, p.
120), ‘‘the possible difference in the periodicity of decision-making
regarding price versus other decisions, such as advertising’’ is a ‘‘tricky
issue’’ mainly because, in practice, we can observe situations where
these decisions can be simultaneous or sequential as shown in the
previous examples. In our knowledge, the empirical research does
not provide a clear explanation of why such discrepancy might ex-
ist; which means that it could be due to various factors such as
managerial practice, commitments with media agencies or with
channel members. Different choices of periodicity for pricing and
marketing efforts could also be due to differing marketing objec-
tives (e.g., encourage short term sales versus build brand equity).
This paper suggests that for ﬁrms operating under similar condi-
tions and having comparable marketing objectives, the periodicity
of pricing and marketing efforts can be endogenously determined
by the distribution channel. Such decision can indeed signiﬁcantly
inﬂuence the strategies and proﬁts of the manufacturer and the re-
tailer. For example, when advertising is determined on a yearly ba-
sis, subsequent quarterly, monthly or weekly prices would be set
given the previously decided advertising for that period. Alterna-
tively, in case of long-term price agreements in the channel, mar-
keting efforts such as weekly retail ﬂyer advertising and
consumer promotions are chosen subsequently to prices. Since,
in practice, the periodicity of pricing and other marketing effort
decision varies as shown in the previous examples, the sequence
of these decisions can be changed and endogenously chosen by
channel members instead of assumed ex-ante.
This paper investigates the optimal periodicity (sequence of
move) for pricing and marketing efforts in the channel. It does so
considering the main vertical interaction scenarios in the channel
studied in the literature; when the manufacturer is leader and
the retailer is follower, or vice versa, or when the channel does
not have a leader and decisions are made simultaneously (vertical
Nash). As deﬁned in the marketing literature, a channel leader is a
member that ‘‘can precommit to an action in the channel, which must
be given by the other channel member(s) as they take their actions’’
(Weitz and Wensley, 2002, p. 233).
A large literature in marketing and operations research has
shown that channel leadership considerably impacts the retailers’
and manufacturers’ prices and proﬁts (e.g., Choi, 1991; Lee and Sta-
elin, 1997). The increasing power of some retailers such as Wal-
Mart and Tesco has motivated many researchers in marketing to
shift their attention from a traditional channel framework where
manufacturers are price leaders to situations where retailers lead
in their pricing decisions (Kadiyali et al., 2000; Cotterill and Putsis,2001; Geylani et al., 2007). Considering both advertising and pric-
ing decisions of channel members, Jørgensen et al. (2001) extended
these results and showed that a manufacturer leadership can pro-
vide superior channel efﬁciency levels to a retail leadership.
Most research about coop advertising programs considered a
manufacturer Stackelberg sequence of move and a few looked at
simultaneous (vertical Nash) games for manufacturers and retail-
ers (Karray and Zaccour, 2006, 2007; Yue et al., 2006; Xie and
Wei, 2009; Ahmadi-Javid and Hoseinpour, 2011). Recently, Xie
and Neyret (2009) and SeyedEsfahani et al. (2011) proposed bar-
gaining solutions by solving manufacturer as well as retailer Stac-
kelberg games in addition to the cooperative solution. Their results
show that marketing efforts, including the cooperative advertising
program, and pricing strategies, as well as channel proﬁts vary con-
siderably with the channel leadership. For example, depending on
the level of ME effectiveness, the manufacturer (retailer) might
prefer to be a leader or a follower. Regardless of which ﬁrm leads
the channel, both papers assume that each channel member deci-
des simultaneously of its pricing and ME.
This research’s objective is to study the effect of the periodic-
ity of pricing and marketing efforts on the equilibrium outcomes.
Similarly to the related literature, we assume that the channel
leadership is determined exogenously and focus on exploring
the effect of separate decision periods of pricing and marketing
efforts on equilibrium strategies and outputs given a vertical
interaction scenario. That is when the manufacturer or the retai-
ler is the channel leader or when both channel members are not
leaders and simultaneously decide of their pricing and ME deci-
sions (vertical Nash). In particular, the paper aims to identify
whether the channel members should play the pricing game at
a different time than the marketing efforts game or simulta-
neously, as conventionally assumed in the literature. This gives
rise to three situations. Speciﬁcally, given a pre-set vertical inter-
action in the channel (manufacturer leadership, retailer leader-
ship or vertical Nash), each channel member; 1 – decides of
its marketing efforts and price simultaneously (benchmark), 2
– chooses ﬁrst its price, then its marketing efforts, and 3 – deci-
des on its marketing efforts, then on its price.
More speciﬁcally, the paper aims to provide answers to the fol-
lowing research questions:
 What are the implications of relaxing the simultaneous move
assumption for marketing efforts and pricing? Are these impli-
cations different when the manufacturer or the retailer is the
channel leader or when channel members play a vertical Nash
game?
 Which periodicity (sequence of move) of pricing and ME is opti-
mal for which channel member, and under what conditions?
In order to address these problems, we develop a game-theo-
retic model and solve for the equilibrium pricing and marketing ef-
forts decisions of the manufacturer (including the coop program)
and of the retailer. We do so for different periodicity of pricing
and marketing efforts and for the three commonly used vertical
interaction scenarios in channels; in case the manufacturer is the
leader, follower or plays Nash with the retailer. Comparison of
the equilibrium solutions within each vertical interaction scenario
shows the impact of the periodicity of pricing and marketing ef-
forts and identiﬁes the preferred periodicity by each channel
member.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 intro-
duces the model. In Sections 3 and 4, we derive the equilibrium
solutions and analyze results for the cases when the manufacturer
(retailer) is the channel leader. Section 5 includes results for the
case of no channel leadership (vertical Nash). Section 6 concludes
and discusses future research avenues.
Table 1
Speciﬁcation of non-cooperative games.
Channel leader Sequences of move
Game 1 Game 2 Game 3
(Prices and
ME)
(Prices, then
ME)
(ME, then
prices)
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We consider a distribution channel formed by one manufac-
turer selling its product through an exclusive retailer. Most of the
literature dealing with cooperative advertising considers a one-
manufacturer, one-retailer channel (bilateral channel). Since we
are exploring the implication of relaxing the simultaneous play
assumption of marketing efforts and pricing, we also consider in
our paper a bilateral channel.
For simplicity and consistency with previous papers in the re-
lated literature, we also assume the following;
 The channel leader, if any, is exogenously determined. Similarly
to the related literature, we assume that the leader moves ﬁrst
in all of the decisions he is undertaking. He can declare both
pricing and marketing efforts decisions simultaneously as com-
monly assumed in the literature. Alternatively, he could have a
multistage decision approach where he would choose pricing
on a separate period (before or after) than marketing efforts.
In this case, the manufacturer can be a ﬁrst-mover in the pricing
game then in the marketing effort game or vice versa.
 We do not take into account channel members’ budget and
resource constraint in order to keep the results manageable.
 The manufacturer’s production costs are taken equal to zero.
The decision variables for the manufacturer are his wholesale
price (w), his non-price marketing efforts (m) such as consumer
promotions, national advertising, etc., and his coop participation
rate (in percentage) in the ME costs of the retailer (t 2 (0, 1)). The
retailer decides of his retail price (p), and his non-price marketing
efforts (r) such as local advertising, merchandising activities, dis-
plays and features, etc.
We choose a demand function that is linear in pricing (McGuire
and Staelin, 1983; Choi, 1991) and concave in marketing efforts to
account for diminishing effects of marketing efforts on sales (Kim
and Staelin, 1999; Desai, 2000; Karray and Zaccour, 2007). The de-
mand decreases in price and increases with both of the channel
members’ marketing efforts. The consumers’ demand (q) is given
by
q ¼ v  pþ d1
ﬃﬃﬃﬃ
m
p þ d2
ﬃﬃ
r
p
; ð1Þ
where v represents the product’s baseline demand. The marginal ef-
fects of marketing efforts on demand are represented by the posi-
tive parameters d1 and d2.1 Marketing efforts of the manufacturer
(m) and the retailer (r) could expand demand in many ways; for
example by increasing awareness for the product, therefore attract-
ing additional consumers, or by increasing the sales volume by cur-
rent buyers. The ME effectiveness level would vary with the kind of
effort undertaken by the manufacturer (e.g., advertising versus con-
sumer promotion), and the retailer (e.g., in-store displays versus
merchandising activities or local advertising) as well as other factors
such as ME content and media choice.
We assume the same cost structure for both channel members
and take production costs equal to zero mainly for tractability.
Using the expression of the demand function in (1), the proﬁts of
the manufacturer (P), the retailer (p) and the entire channel (C)
are given by
P ¼ wq ðtr þmÞ; p ¼ ðpwÞq ð1 tÞr; C ¼ Pþ p:
We focus our analysis on three sequences of move mainly to
separate the decision periods for marketing efforts and pricing in
order to address our research objective. Speciﬁcally, when a1 An extension of the model to the case where the effect of price on demand is
different from one can be easily obtained without loss of generability by assuming the
parameters d1 and d2 as relative marketing effort effects.channel member assumes a leadership position, it is assumed in
the literature that the Stackelberg leader moves ﬁrst and chooses
all of its decisions simultaneously and the follower chooses next,
also simultaneously, all of its decisions knowing the leader’s an-
nounced actions (this is the benchmark scenario). Similarly, we
consider that the leader will move ﬁrst for each element of the
marketing mix (ME and prices) but allow for different periods of
decision-making. Hence, the Stackelberg leader can play two sepa-
rate games at different periods. He can lead ﬁrst in the pricing
game then in the marketing effort game or vice versa. In case the
channel does not have a leader, channel members can decide of
their marketing mix strategies simultaneously as assumed in the
existing literature. However, we allow for different periods of
decision-making for pricing and ME.
In order to represent different periodicity for pricing and mar-
keting efforts decisions under a given vertical interaction scenario
(manufacturer leadership, retailer leadership, and vertical Nash),
we solve the following three games;
(1) Game 1: This is the commonly used sequence of move where
each channel member decides of all of its marketing mix
variables (price and ME) simultaneously. When the channel
has a leader, the manufacturer and the retailer play a two-
stage non-cooperative game. In the ﬁrst stage, the leader
sets simultaneously its price and marketing efforts. In the
second stage, the follower simultaneously decides of its
price and marketing efforts given the leader’s decisions. In
case the channel does not have a leader, the channel mem-
bers play a one-stage game and decide simultaneously of
all of their marketing mix variables.
(2) Game 2: In this case, channel members decide of prices
before they decide of their ME. In case there is a channel lea-
der, the latter plays two sequential games; ﬁrst in prices
then in ME. Overall, the channel members play a four-stage,
non-cooperative game. First, the leader sets its price. Second,
the follower decides of its price given the leader’s
announced price. Third, the leader sets its marketing effort
given both wholesale and retail prices. Finally, the follower
chooses its ME knowing all previous decisions. In case the
channel does not have a leader (vertical Nash), the manufac-
turer and the retailer play a two-stage game where whole-
sale and retail prices are decided simultaneously in a ﬁrst
stage and ME are decided simultaneously in a second stage
given the previously announced prices.
(3) Game 3: In this last scenario, channel members decide of
prices after they decide of their ME. In case there is a channel
leader, the latter plays two sequential games; ﬁrst in ME
then in prices. The four-stage, non-cooperative game starts
with the leader setting its ME strategies, then the follower
deciding of its ME given the leader’s announced decision.
Third, the leader sets its price given the previously decided
ME levels. Finally, the follower chooses its price knowing
all other decisions. In case the channel does not have a lea-
der (vertical Nash), the manufacturer and the retailer play a
two-stage game where ME are decided simultaneously in aManufacturer M1 M2 M3
Retailer R1 R2 R3
None (Vertical
Nash)
N1 N2 N3
Table 2
Equilibrium solutions for each Mi (i = 1, 2, 3).
M1 M2 M3
w vð163d22Þ
329d224d21
4vð64þd42þ2d21d2212d22Þ
512d22 16d2124d22þ4d41þd42þ208ð Þ
16vð32d22Þ
1024192d22d21d22128d21
m 16v2d21
329d224d21ð Þ2
4v2d21ð6412d22þd42þ2d21d22Þ2
512d22 208þ16d2124d22þ4d41þd42ð Þ½ 2
v2d21ð128þd22Þ2
1024192d22d21d22128d21ð Þ2
t 1
3
48þd428d22þ4d21d228d21
80þd4216d22þ8d21
48þd22
80
P 4v2
329d224d21
4v2ð16þd21d22Þ
512d22 16d2124d22þ4d41þd42þ208ð Þ
v2ð128þd22Þ
1024192d22d21d22128d21
p 3vð8d22Þ
329d224d21
4vð8d22Þð12d22þ2d21Þ
512d22 16d2124d22þ4d41þd42þ208ð Þ
24vð32d22Þ
1024192d22d21d22128d21
r 36v2d22
329d224d21ð Þ2
4v2d22ð80þd4216d22þ8d21Þ2
512d22 16d2124d22þ4d41þd42þ208ð Þ½ 2
160vd2ð Þ2
1024192d22d21d22128d21ð Þ2
p  w 8v
329d224d21
16v 4d22ð Þ d21þ2ð Þ
512d22 16d2124d22þ4d41þd42þ208ð Þ
8v 32d22ð Þ
1024192d22d21d22128d21
p 8v2 83d22ð Þ
329d224d21ð Þ2
32 8d22ð Þ v d224ð Þ d21þ2ð Þ½ 2
512d22 16d2124d22þ4d41þd42þ208ð Þ½ 2
128v2 163d22ð Þ 32d22ð Þ
1024192d22d21d22128d21ð Þ2
q 8v
329d224d21
v 12816d21d2212d42þ32d22þd62þ64d21þ2d21d42ð Þ
512d22 16d2124d22þ4d41þd42þ208ð Þ
8vð32d22Þ
1024192d22d21d22128d21
Fig. 1. Feasible domain for Mi.
Table 3
Equilibrium solution for Mi (i = 1, 2, 3) given the domain regions represented in Fig. 1.
Domain
region
Manufacturer Retailer
I M1 if PM1 > maxðPM2;PM3Þ;
M2 if PM2 > maxðPM1;PM3Þ;
M3 otherwise:
M1 if pM1 > maxðpM2;pM3Þ;
M2 if pM2 > maxðpM1;pM3Þ;
M3 otherwise:
II M3 M3
III M2 if PM2 > PM3;
M3 otherwise:
M2 if pM2 > pM3;
M3 otherwise:
IV M2 M2
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simultaneously in a second stage given the previously
announced ME.
Given that the channel leader can be the manufacturer or the re-
tailer and adding the scenario of no leadership (vertical Nash), we
solve in total nine non-cooperative games as illustrated in Table 1.
3. Effect of ME and price sequence of move when the
manufacturer is the channel leader
3.1. Equilibrium solution and feasible domain
We start by solving the three games for the case where the
channel is led by the manufacturer. In M1, the manufacturer deci-
des ﬁrst of its price (w) and marketing efforts mix (m and t). Sec-
ond, the retailer sets its price (p) and ME level (r) given the
announced manufacturer’s strategies. In M2 and M3, the manufac-
turer plays two Stackelberg games for prices and ME.
In M2, the pricing game is played ﬁrst; the manufacturer deci-
des of w then the retailer decides of p given the announced whole-
sale price. The ME are decided next in a second manufacturer
Stackelberg game; knowing both retail and wholesale prices, the
manufacturer decides of m and t, and in a ﬁnal stage the retailer
sets its ME (r) given all previously decided actions. Similarly, in
M3, the manufacturer plays ﬁrst the Stackelberg game in ME then
in price. The solution to each of these games is obtained by back-
ward induction and is provided in Table 2. All proof is included is
in Appendix 1.2
We identify themarket conditions for which each of the threeMi
(i = 1, 2, 3) games is feasible before comparing these equilibrium
outputs to identify which sequence of move in price andME is opti-
mal for each channel member (i.e., provides maximum proﬁts).
Using the second-order conditions as well as the necessary and
sufﬁcient conditions for positive equilibrium solutions (see Appen-
dix 1); we identify the feasible domain for each Mi, which is repre-
sented in Fig. 1.3
Given the feasible domain, we can now state the equilibrium
solution for each channel member.
Proposition 1. Under the manufacturer’s leadership, the equilibrium
solution for each channel member in the feasible domain is given in
Table 3
Proposition 1 shows that in some regions of the feasible do-
main, only one sequence of move can be chosen by both channel
members (II and IV) while in others (I and III), the optimal se-
quence of move for each of the manufacturer and the retailer
would be the one that maximizes its proﬁts.
For example, in region (II), characterized by the highest levels of
d2, only M3 is feasible. Under such conditions, the manufacturer
should decide of ME before setting prices in order to achieve opti-
mal strategies. However, for the highest levels of d1 in the feasible
domain (region IV), the manufacturer can only play M2. In such
cases, the equilibrium solution is reached only if the manufacturer
leads the channel ﬁrst in pricing then in ME.
In the remaining feasible domain, a menu of M1, M2 and M3 is
available to the channel. Notably, for low levels of d2, pricing can be
decided before, after or simultaneously with ME, whereas for high-
er ranges of d2, pricing can be decided either after or before ME.2 Note that since sequential games are considered in the paper, the reaction
functions illustrate the relationship between the marketing efforts decision variables
(m and r) and the pricing variables (p and w). These functions are included in
Appendix 1.
3 Outside of the feasible domain, at least one channel member is getting negative
proﬁts at equilibrium, and the game assumed in the paper cannot be played.Therefore, the identiﬁcation of the optimal sequence of move for
price and ME would depend on which region of the feasible do-
main is considered for analysis. We now compare equilibrium
solutions in the domain regions where more than one game is fea-
sible (I and III).
In the rest of the paper, all analytical results are presented in
Propositions. Given the complexity of some expressions, we will
use notations ai for functions of d1 and d2, and xi for functions of
d1 or d2, and include them in Appendix 2 for simplicity. All proof
is in Appendix 1.
Numerical results are presented whenever we obtain closed-
form conditions that are not amenable to analytical analysis be-
cause of their complexity. In such cases, we obtain results by
varying d1 and d2 in the feasible domain with a pace of 0.001
or smaller.
S. Karray / European Journal of Operational Research 228 (2013) 635–647 6393.2. Effect of sequence of move of pricing and marketing effort
decisions
In order to determine the preferred equilibrium solution for
each channel member in regions (I) and (III) of the feasible domain,
we start by comparing equilibrium outputs in M2 and M3.
Proposition 2. Under the manufacturer’s leadership, equilibrium
solutions in M2 and M3 in the feasible domain (I and III) compare as
follows;
PM3 > PM2 , d1 > d24
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
2864d22 þ 104d42 þ d62 þ 13 824
380d22 þ 47d42 þ 512
vuut ;
pM3 > pM2 , a1 > 0; CM3 > CM2 , a2 > 0;
wM3 > wM2 , d1 2 ðx0; x1Þ; mM3 > mM2 , d1 > x2;
pM3 > pM2 , d1 > x3; rM3 > rM2 , d1 > x4;
tM3 > tM2 , d1 > d2
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
48d22 þ d42  48
8 39d22  128
 
vuut ; qM3 > qM2 , d1 > x5:
We now explore further the analytical conditions obtained in
this Proposition in each of the domain regions where M2 and M3
can both be played (I and III). As we can see in Fig. 2, the manufac-
turer prefers M3 in the feasible domain (III) for high levels of d1 be-
cause of the associated gains in unit margin and sales volume,
hence revenues and prefers M2 for lower levels of d1 (more details
about these conditions are discussed in Appendix 1).Numerical Result 1. Under the manufacturer’s leadership and in the
feasible domain (III), pM3 > pM2 for low or high values of d1 and
pM3 < pM2 otherwise.
These ﬁndings show that although the retailer can prefer the
same sequence of move as the manufacturer for extreme values
of d1 (M3), it also prefers M3 in case of very low levels of d1
(Fig. 2). This suggests a possible conﬂict in the channel about the
preferred sequence of move. In case of divergent preferences in
the channel for M2 and M3, i.e., for very low d1 levels, comparison
of channel proﬁts obtained in each game can give some insight
about whether the conﬂict could be resolved through redistribu-
tion of total channel proﬁts.
Numerical Result 2. Under the manufacturer’s leadership and in the
feasible domain (III), CM3 >CM2 for very high values of d1 and
CM3 <CM2 otherwise.
This result indicates that resolution of channel conﬂict through
redistribution of overall proﬁts cannot be achieved in the domain
region (III). In this case, the total channel proﬁt is higher in M3
whenever it is also preferred by the manufacturer, and is lower
otherwise. This means that the retailer will have to bear the
opportunity cost from not playing M3 because the retailer’s gainsFig. 2. Channel conﬂifrom playing M3 will not be sufﬁcient to overcome the manufac-
turer’s opportunity cost. The channel conﬂict arising from different
preferences for M2 and M3 cannot be solved with a side-payment
agreement (Fig. 2).
We now turn to the comparison of equilibrium solutions in re-
gion (I) of the feasible domain where all three Mi games are feasi-
ble. We compare pairwise equilibrium solutions in order to draw
conclusions about the overall preferred outcome. Since Proposition
2 provides necessary conditions to determine the optimal outcome
for (M2, M3), we compare next the equilibria in M1 and M3.
Proposition 3. Under the manufacturer’s leadership, equilibrium
solutions in M1 and M3 in the feasible domain (I) compare as follows;PM3 < PM1; CM3 < CM1; pM3 < pM1 , d1 > x6;
wM3 > wM1 , d1 < 4
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
64 27d22
3d22 þ 304
vuut ; pM3 < pM1;
mM3 < mM1; t3 < t1; r3 < r1; qM3 < qM1;
pM3 wM3 < pM1 wM1:
This Proposition shows that the leading manufacturer should
prefer M1 to M3. This is explained by the fact that simultaneous
decision-making of pricing and ME yields higher sales units. In
M1, although the manufacturer invests higher levels of direct ME
to consumers (mM3 <mM1), he decreases his participation into the
retailer’s ME. Overall, the higher sales generated in M1 boosts
the manufacturer’s revenue levels even when it gets a smaller mar-
gin. This explains the higher manufacturer’s proﬁts in M1 and
means that the leader is better off deciding of pricing and ME
simultaneously than setting ME before prices.
On the retail side, lower revenues are generated in M3 than in
M1. Although the consumer price is lower in M3, the retailer in-
vests less intensively in ME, which leads to a lower overall de-
mand. The decrease in price is also accompanied by a lower
retail margin, which explains the lower retail revenues in M3.
Looking at costs, the retailer invests less in ME but does not get
as high a manufacturer’s coop rate as in M1. Therefore, the retai-
ler’s ME costs can be higher or lower depending on the levels of
ME effectiveness. The overall effect on the retailer’s proﬁts is mixed
and the latter would prefer M3 to M1 only when d1 levels are high
enough as shown in Fig. 3.
Proposition 3 also shows that, even when pM1 > pM3, the overall
channel proﬁts is still lower in M3 compared to its level in M1. This
means that any channel conﬂict that may arise in this case can be
resolved through side-payment agreements from the manufac-
turer to the retailer. Therefore, the leading manufacturer could al-
ways avoid playing M3 in the feasible domain (I).
Finally, the optimal sequence of move for each channel member
can be determined by comparing the equilibrium outputs in M1
and M2 in the feasible domain (I).ct in region (III).
Fig. 3. pM3  pM1 (region I).
640 S. Karray / European Journal of Operational Research 228 (2013) 635–647Proposition 4. Under the manufacturer’s leadership, equilibrium
solutions in M1 and M2 in the feasible domain (I) compare as follows;Fig. 5. pM2  pM1.PM2 > PM1 , d1 <
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
d62  24d42 þ 64d22
9d42 þ 64 48d22
vuut ;
pM2 > pM1 , a3 > 0; CM2 > CM1 , a4 > 0;
wM2 < wM1 , d1 > x7; pM2 > pM1 , d1 2 ðx11; x12Þ;
mM2 > mM1 , d1 < x8; qM2 < qM1 , d1 > x9;
rM2 < rM1 , d1 > x10;
tM2 > tM1 , d1 <
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
d42 þ 4d22  32
6d22  16
vuut :
This Proposition shows that the leading manufacturer can pre-
fer M2 or M1 depending on market conditions. As we can see in
Fig. 4, the manufacturer should choose to lead simultaneously in
pricing and ME (M1) only for levels of d1 that are higher than d2.
Alternatively, the manufacturer will gain higher proﬁts if it leads
ﬁrst in price then in ME (M2) when the retailer’s ME are more
effective than then manufacturer’s (d2 > d1). The latter situation is
not uncommon since the retailer is often more effective at running
consumer promotions than manufacturers because of its better
knowledge of consumer preferences and access to point of sale
data.Fig. 4. Comparisons for ðPMiÞ in region (I).This constitutes an important ﬁnding; contrary to the common
assumption used in the coop advertising literature with bilateral
channels (e.g., Karray and Zaccour, 2006; Xie and Wei, 2009; He
et al., 2009; Ahmadi-Javid and Hoseinpour, 2011; SeyedEsfahani
et al., 2011), a simultaneous decision-making of prices and ME
by the channel members under the manufacturer leadership might
not be the optimal choice for the leader.
Numerical Result 3. Under the manufacturer’s leadership and in the
feasible domain (I), pM1 > pM2 for very low or high values of d1 and
pM1 < pM2 otherwise.Numerical Result 4. Under the manufacturer’s leadership and in the
feasible domain (I);
 PM2 >PM1 [ pM2 < pM1) CM2 > CM1,
 PM2 <PM1 [ pM2 > pM1) CM2 > CM1 for high values of d1.
These numerical results show that the retailer would prefer to
play M2 rather than M1 except in some cases of very low or high
values of d1 within the feasible domain (I) (Fig. 5). In case of low
values of d1, whenever the retailer prefers M1, the manufacturer
as well as the total channel get higher proﬁts by playing the se-
quence of move M2 (Fig. 6). Therefore, the manufacturer preferred
sequence of play in this case is the one that maximizes total chan-
nel proﬁts. The retailer can be ‘‘convinced’’ to choose the sequence
of move M2 instead of M1 for this reason, which will alleviate con-
ﬂict between channel members.Fig. 6. CM2  CM1.
Table 5
Equilibrium solutions for each Ri (i = 1, 2, 3).
R1 R2 R3
w 2v
8d222d21
2v 4d21ð Þ
d21d222ð Þ d22þd216ð Þ
2v 8d21ð Þ
d418d2216d21þ64
m v2d21
8d222d21ð Þ2
v2d21 4d21ð Þ2
d21d222ð Þ d22þd216ð Þ½ 2
v2d21 8d21ð Þ2
d418d2216d21þ64ð Þ2
t 0 0 0
P v2 83d21ð Þ
8d222d21ð Þ2
v2 2d22d21ð Þ 4d21ð Þ2
d21d222ð Þ d22þd216ð Þ½ 2
v2 8d21ð Þ3
d418d2216d21þ64ð Þ2
p 4v
8d222d21
2v 62d21þd22ð Þ
d21d222ð Þ d22þd216ð Þ
4v 8d21ð Þ
d418d2216d21þ64
r v2d22
8d222d21ð Þ2
v2d22
6d22d21ð Þ2
64v2d22
d418d2216d21þ64ð Þ2
p  w 2v
8d222d21
2v
6d22d21
2vð8d21Þ
d418d2216d21þ64
p v2
8d222d21
v2d22
d21d222ð Þ d22þd216ð Þ
8v2
d418d2216d21þ64
q v 4d21ð Þ
8d222d21
vd22 4d21ð Þ
d21d222ð Þ d22þd216ð Þ
4v 8d21ð Þ
d418d2216d21þ64
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and the manufacturer also disagree on their preferred sequence of
move. In this case, the manufacturer prefers M1 and the retailer
prefers M2, and the total channel proﬁt is maximized by the retai-
ler’s preferred sequence of move M2. The conﬂict cannot be easily
resolved since the leader’s preferred sequence of move is detri-
mental to both the retailer and the total channel proﬁts.
These numerical results show that for some values of d1 and d2
in the feasible domain (I), M1 can be detrimental to the proﬁts of
both channel members and even when it is preferred by the lead-
ing manufacturer, it can harm the total channel’s efﬁciency. Based
on the results obtained in the previous Propositions, we can now
draw conclusions about the equilibrium solution for each channel
member.
Corollary 1. Under the manufacturer’s leadership, the equilibrium
solution for each channel member and the entire channel is given in
Table 4
Corollary 1 shows that the leading manufacturer would prefer
to decide simultaneously of pricing and ME only in a small region
of the parameters domain and given high enough values of d1. This
result points to the importance of relaxing the simultaneous play
assumption of pricing and ME in order to represent the case where
the manufacturer explores a wider range of strategies. Namely, the
leading manufacturer can choose a more proﬁtable sequence of
move when the retailer’s ME are more effective than its ME, and
lead the channel given a wider range of ME effectiveness levels.
In fact, for very high levels of d1 and d2, sequential play of pricing
and ME allows channel members to implement equilibrium strat-
egies and therefore achieve maximum proﬁts (Figs. 4 and 5).
Further, the leading manufacturer can beneﬁt from implement-
ing a sequence of move that would not maximize its proﬁts but
could extract additional channel proﬁts instead (in regions I and
III). This not only alleviates possible conﬂict with the following re-
tailer, when the latter prefers a different sequence of move of pric-
ing and ME, but could also beneﬁt the manufacturer after
redistribution of additional channel proﬁts.
4. Effect of ME and price sequence of move when the retailer is
the channel leader
4.1. Equilibrium solution and feasible domain
In this case, the retailer is the channel leader. In R1, the retailer
decides ﬁrst simultaneously of its price (p) and ME (r). Second, the
manufacturer sets its price (w) and ME mix (m and t) given the re-
tailer’s announced decisions. In R2 and R3, the retailer plays two
separate Stackelberg games for pricing and ME.
In R2, the pricing game is played ﬁrst; the retailer decides of p
then the manufacturer decides of w given the previously an-
nounced retail price. The ME are decided next in a second retailer
Stackelberg game; knowing both retail and wholesale prices, the
retailer decides of r, and in a ﬁnal stage the manufacturer sets itsTable 4
equilibrium solution for Mi (i = 1, 2, 3).
Region Manufacturer
I
M2 M1, d1 <
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
d6224d42þ64d22
9d42þ6448d22
r
II M3
III
M3 M2, d1 > d24
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
2864d22þ104d42þd62þ13 824
380d22þ47d42þ512
r
IV M2ME mix (m and t) given all previously decided actions. Finally, in
R3, the retailer plays ﬁrst the Stackelberg game in ME then in price.
The solution for each of these games is obtained by backward
induction and is provided in Table 5. All proof is in Appendix 1.
The equilibrium solution shows that when the channel is led by
the retailer, the manufacturer does not offer a coop advertising
program (tRi = 0, i = 1, 2, 3). This result is in line with Xie and Neyret
(2009) and SeyedEsfahani et al. (2011) who also studied coop pro-
grams in channels led by the retailer, and generalizes their result to
the case where R2 and R3 sequence of move are considered. The
intuition for this ﬁnding is that the manufacturer does not have
an incentive to stimulate the retailer’s ME if the retailer has already
announced its ME decision.
Similarly to the manufacturer leadership scenario, we ﬁrst iden-
tify the market conditions for which each Ri game is feasible using
the necessary and sufﬁcient conditions for positive equilibrium
solutions. Then, we compare these equilibrium outputs in order
to identify which sequence of move is optimal for each channel
member.
Proposition 5. Under the retailer’s leadership, the equilibrium solu-
tion for each channel member in the feasible domain is given in Table 6
Proposition 5 results are represented in Fig. 7. They show that
the acceptable domain for the Ri games is even more fragmented
than in the case of the manufacturer’s leadership. In two domain
regions (IV and V), the channel members can implement only
one sequence of move under the retailer’s leadership. On one hand,
only R3 is feasible when the manufacturer’s ME effectiveness (d1)
is low enough but the retailer’s ME effect (d2) is ‘‘very’’ high or vice
versa (region IV). In this case, ME should be decided prior to prices
in order to achieve optimal strategies. On the other hand, for inter-
mediate levels of d2 coupled with very high levels of d1 (region V),
only R2 is feasible; meaning that the optimal solution is reached
only if the retailer leads the channel ﬁrst in prices then in ME.Retailer Channel
M3 M2, a1 > 0
M2 M1, a3 > 0
M3 M1, d1 > x6
8<
:
M2 M1,a4 > 0
M3 M3
M3 M2,a1 > 0 M3 M2,a2 > 0
M2 M2
Fig. 7. Feasible domain for Ri.
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R3 are available to the channel. For example, for intermediate lev-
els of both d1 and d2; pricing cannot be decided simultaneously
with ME (region II) and the retailer will choose the sequence of
move that maximizes its proﬁts. In these regions (I, II and III),
the optimal sequence of move for pricing and ME for each channel
member is the one that yields maximum proﬁts.
As in the previous section, determining the optimal Ri game
would depend on which region of the feasible domain is consid-
ered for analysis. Therefore, we compare equilibrium solutions
when more than two games are feasible (regions I, II and III).
4.2. Effect of sequence of move of price and marketing effort decisions
Proposition 6. Under the retailer’s leadership, equilibrium solutions
in R1 and R3 in the feasible domain (I and III) compare as follows;
PR3 > PR1; pR3 < pR1; CR3 > CR1 , d2 < x13;
wR3 < wR1; pR3 < pR1; ðpR3 wR3Þ < ðpR1 wR1Þ;
mR3 < mR1; rR3 < rR1; qR3 > qR1:Corollary 2. Under the retailer’s leadership, at equilibrium and in the
feasible domain (III); CR3 < CR1.
Proposition 6 suggests that the retailer should prefer R1 to R3
while the manufacturer should choose R3. For the retailer, R1 pro-
vides higher margins and lower ME costs. For the manufacturer,
the increased margins and gains on ME costs in R1 are not sufﬁ-
cient to compensate for the drop in sales; which explains its pref-
erence for R3.
The ﬁrst implication of this result is that when only these two
games are feasible (in region III); the optimal sequence of move
is R1 for the leading retailer and R3 for the following manufacturer.
The result in Corollary 2 shows that the total channel proﬁt is also
higher in R1 than it is in R3 in this domain region. Therefore, the
manufacturer would not be able to convince the retailer to play
R3 and will have to assume the opportunity cost of playing R1. Sec-
ondly, in the feasible domain (I) where all three Ri games can be
played by the channel members, the manufacturer will prefer RiTable 6
Equilibrium solution for Ri (i = 1, 2, 3) given the domain regions represented in Fig. 7.
Region Manufacturer Retailer
I Ri such as PRi = max(PR1, PR2,
PR3)
Ri such as pRi = max(pR1, pR2,
pR3)
II R2 if PR2 >PR3, R3 otherwise R2 if pR2 > pR3, R3 otherwise
III R1 if PR1 >PR3, R3 otherwise R1 if pR1 > pR3, R3 otherwise
IV R3 R3
V R2 R2such as PRi = max(PR2, PR3) and the retailer will choose Ri such
as pRi = max(pR1, pR2).
The optimal game for the overall channel will be Ri such as
CRi = max(CR1, CR2, CR3). Next, we compare equilibrium outputs
from R2 and R3.
Proposition 7. Under the retailer’s leadership, equilibrium solutions
in R2 and R3 in the feasible domain (I and II) compare as follows;
pR3 > pR2 , d2 <
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
8 d21  6
 
d21  2
 
32 16d21 þ d41
vuut
;
PR3 > PR2 , a5 > 0; CR3 > CR2 , a6 > 0;
wR3 < wR2; pR3 < pR2; ðpR3 wR3Þ < ðpR2 wR2Þ;
mR3 < mR2; rR3 < rR2; qR3 > qR2 , d2 < x14:Corollary 3. Under the retailer’s leadership, at equilibrium and in the
feasible domain (I); qR3 > qR2.
In the feasible domain (I), Proposition 7 and Corollary 3 show
that R2 provides larger margins but higher ME costs and fewer
sales for both channel members; mainly because of the increase
in the retail price. This means that R2 does not always lead to high-
er revenue levels for the retailer and the manufacturer compared
to the sequence of move in R3. These results also show that, at
equilibrium, both channel members spend higher amounts for
marketing efforts in R2 than in R3. Therefore, R2 can be preferred
by each channel member only if it also increases their revenues.
As shown in Proposition 7, the preferred sequence of move (R2
or R3) will depend on the values of d1 and d2.
On the retail side, when only R2 and R3 are feasible (region II),
the retailer should implement R2 in most cases except when both
d1 and d2 take low values in the acceptable domain (Fig. 8). When
R1 is also a feasible game (region I), the comparison of retail proﬁts
in R2 and R3 is not very important to identify the optimal game in
region (I) since we have already established in Proposition 6 that
the retailer will choose Ri such as pRi = max(pR1, pR2).
For the manufacturer, it is important to compare outputs from
R2 and R3 in order to determine the optimal game in the feasible
domain (I and II). As illustrated in Fig. 9, the manufacturer would
gain higher proﬁts in R3 than in R2 when d1 is either low enough
or very high in the acceptable domain.
Numerical Result 5. Under the retailer’s leadership, numerical
analysis of the total channel’s equilibrium proﬁts in R2 and R3 in the
feasible domain (II) shows that
PR2 > PR3 ) CR2 > CR3:Fig. 8. pR3  pR2 in regions (I) and (II).
Fig. 9. PR3 PR2 (in I and II).
Fig. 11. a5 for d2 <
ﬃﬃﬃ
2
p
.
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game, it would also provide maximum proﬁts to the entire chan-
nel. In this case, any conﬂict that may arise from a different se-
quence of move preferred by the retailer can be resolved by
redistribution of channel proﬁts. Note however that the opposite
is not true; the numerical analysis shows that it is possible to have
PR2 <PR3 and CR2 >CR3 in region (II) as illustrated in Figs. 9 and
10. In this situation, the retailer prefers R2 and would not be will-
ing to play R3 (the manufacturer’s preferred sequence of move) be-
cause of the detrimental effects not only on its proﬁts but also on
the overall channel proﬁts. Therefore, conﬂicted choices of Ri
games would still persist in the channel. Next, we compare equilib-
rium outputs from R1 and R2.Proposition 8. Under the retailer’s leadership, equilibrium solutions
in R1 and R2 in the feasible domain (I) compare as follows;pR2 <pR1, d1 >
ﬃﬃﬃ
2
p
; PR2 >PR1,a7 >0; CR2 >CR1,a8 >0;
wR2 >wR1; pR2 > pR1; mR2 >mR1;
rR2 > rR1; qR2 > qR1; ðpR2wR2Þ> ðpR1wR1Þ, d1 <
ﬃﬃﬃ
2
p
:
This result shows ﬁrst that the retailer can ﬁnd it optimal to
play R1 only for high levels of the manufacturer’s ME effectiveness
ðd1 >
ﬃﬃﬃ
2
p
Þ; mainly because the product sales are higher and so is
the retail margins, which leads to higher revenues in R1 than in
R2. This means that when the retailer leads the channel and can
decide of prices not only simultaneously but also prior or after
ME, the best sequence of move could be to play R1 only whenFig. 10. CR3  CR2 (in I and II).the manufacturer’s direct ME to consumers are high enough. Note
that a very small part of the feasible domain (I) corresponds to val-
ues of d1 >
ﬃﬃﬃ
2
p
(Fig. 7); which means that the necessary conditions
for R1  R2 are very restrictive.
Therefore, the assumption that a retailer plays a two-stage Stac-
kelberg game to decide of pricing and ME does not reﬂect the opti-
mal periodicity choice for the leading retailer (Xie and Neyret,
2009; SeyedEsfahani et al., 2011). Indeed, the retailer could choose
different periodicity for its decisions for high values of the manu-
facturer’s ME effect.
For the manufacturer, the choice between R1 and R2 is not very
relevant since in the feasible domain (I), it gets maximum proﬁts
either from playing R2 or R3 (Proposition 6). It is however interest-
ing to analyze further the situation when both channel members
favor the same sequence of move (R2).
Given the results in Propositions 7 and 8, the manufacturer and
the retailer prefer R2 at equilibrium when these conditions are
veriﬁed;
d1 <
ﬃﬃﬃ
2
p
; a5 < 0:
Fig. 11 represents values of a5(d1, d2), which is included in
Appendix 2, for d1 <
ﬃﬃﬃ
2
p
. We can see that a5 takes negative values
mainly for high values of d2. Therefore, for high levels of d2 and low
levels of d1ðd1 <
ﬃﬃﬃ
2
p
Þ; there is no conﬂict between channel mem-
bers about their favorite sequence of move since they would both
prefer R2. However, the channel conﬂict would persist in the
remaining domain, speciﬁcally in the following situations;
(1) The manufacturer prefers R3 and the retailer prefers R2 or
R1; ﬃﬃﬃp
 a5 > 0 [ d1 > 2; in this case, conﬂict can be resolved iff
CR3 >CR1,d2 < x13 (Proposition 6).
 a5 > 0 [ d1 <
ﬃﬃﬃ
2
p
; in this case, conﬂict can be resolved iff
CR3 >CR2,a6 > 0 (Proposition 7).
(2) The manufacturer prefers R2 and the retailer prefers R1
ða5 < 0 [ d1 >
ﬃﬃﬃ
2
p
Þ; in this case, conﬂict can be resolved iff
CR2 >CR1,a8 > 0 (Proposition 8).
We conduct numerical simulations in order to explore the total
channel proﬁts under these different conditions and ﬁnd evidence
that in each of these cases, conﬂict could be resolved only for some
values of d1 and d2.
Finally, we can state the equilibrium solution for the channel in
the entire feasible domain.
Corollary 4. Under the retailer’s leadership, the preferred game by
each channel member and by the entire channel is given in Table 7Corollary 4 shows that the leading retailer would prefer to de-
cide simultaneously of pricing and ME only in a restricted region
of the parameters domain and given values of d1 that are higher
than d2. This indicates that the Stackelberg game in price and ME
Table 7
equilibrium solution Ri (i = 1, 2, 3).
Region Manufacturer Retailer Channel
I R3  R2,a7 > 0 R2  R1, d1 <
ﬃﬃﬃ
2
p
R3  R2, a8 > 0
R2  R1, a10 > 0
R3  R1, d2 < x13
8<
:
II R3  R2,a7 > 0
R3  R2, d2 <
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
8 d216ð Þ d212ð Þ
16d21þd41þ32
r
R3  R2,a8 > 0
III R3 R1 R3  R1,d2 < x13
IV R3 R3 R3
V R2 R2 R2
644 S. Karray / European Journal of Operational Research 228 (2013) 635–647under the retailer’s leadership (i.e., R1) does not represent the opti-
mal strategy for both channel members in most cases. Relaxing this
assumption by considering alternative periodicity scenarios of
prices and ME, would therefore allow the retailer to choose a more
proﬁtable sequence of move, especially when its ME are more
effective than the manufacturer’s. It also allows a more thorough
examination of channel strategies for a wide range of ME effective-
ness levels.
In fact, for very high levels of d1 and d2, sequential play of pric-
ing and ME allows channel members to implement equilibrium
strategies and therefore achieve maximum proﬁts. Further, when
the manufacturer and the retailer prefer different periodicity of
pricing and ME decisions (regions I, II and III), conﬂict could be re-
solved through redistribution of overall channel proﬁts but only for
some values of d1 and d2.
5. Effect of ME and price sequence of move in case of no
leadership (vertical Nash)
5.1. Equilibrium solution and feasible domain
In case the channel does not have a leader, the manufacturer
and the retailer choose simultaneously their pricing and marketing
effort strategies. In N1, the retailer and the manufacturer decide
simultaneously of their prices (p, w) and ME (r, m, t). In N2, the
manufacturer and the retailer decide simultaneously of their prices
(p, w) in a ﬁrst stage and of their ME mix (r, m and t) in a second
stage given the previously decided prices. Finally, in N3, the man-
ufacturer and the retailer decide simultaneously of their ME mix (r,
m and t) in a ﬁrst stage and of their prices (p, w) in a second stage
given the previously decided ME levels. The solution for each of
these games is obtained by backward induction and is provided
in Table 8. All proof is in Appendix 1.
Similarly to the retailer leadership scenario, when channel
members play Nash, the manufacturer does not offer a coop adver-Table 8
Equilibrium solutions for each Ni (i = 1, 2, 3).
N1 N2 N3
w 2v
6d22d21
4v
4d222d21d42þ4
2v
8d22d21
m 4v2
6d22d21ð Þ2
4v2d21
4d222d21d42þ4ð Þ2
v2d21
8d22d21ð Þ2
t 0 0 0
P v2ð4d21Þ
6d22d21ð Þ2
4v2ð2d22d21Þ
4d222d21d42þ4ð Þ2
v2 8d21ð Þ
8d22d21ð Þ2
p 4v
6d22d21
2v 2þd22ð Þ
4d222d21d42þ4
4v
8d22d21
r v2d22
6d22d21ð Þ2
v2d62
4d222d21d42þ4ð Þ2
v2d22
8d22d21ð Þ2
p  w 2v
6d22d21
2vd22
4d222d21d42þ4
2v
8d22d21
p v2 4d22ð Þ
6d22d21ð Þ2
v2d42 4d22ð Þ
4d222d21d42þ4ð Þ2
v2 8d22ð Þ
8d22d21ð Þ2
q 2v
6d22d21
2vd22
4d222d21d42þ4
4v
8d22d21tising program at equilibrium (tNi = 0, i = 1, 2, 3). This is because the
manufacturer does not have an incentive to stimulate the retailer’s
ME since the latter does not consider the coop rate when making
the retail ME decision.
As in the previous sections, we ﬁrst identify the market condi-
tions for which each Ni game is feasible using the necessary and
sufﬁcient conditions for positive equilibrium solutions. Then, we
compare these equilibrium outputs in order to identify which se-
quence of move is optimal for each channel member.
Proposition 9. When the channel does not have a leader, the
equilibrium solution for each channel member in the feasible domain
is given by;
Fig. 12 and Table 9 show that in the domain region (III), the
channel members can implement only the sequence of move N3.
In this case, highly effective marketing efforts are performed either
by the retailer or by the manufacturer, and ME should be decided
prior to prices in order to achieve optimal strategies. However, in
the remaining feasible domain, different menus of N1, N2 and N3
are available to the channel. In this case, the optimal sequence of
move for pricing and ME for each channel member is the one that
yields maximum proﬁts.
As in the previous sections, the optimal sequence of move
would depend on which region of the feasible domain isFig. 12. Feasible domain for Ni.
Table 9
Equilibrium solution for Ni (i = 1, 2, 3) given the domain regions represented in
Fig. 12.
Region Manufacturer Retailer
I Ni such as PNi = max (PN1, PN2,
PN3)
Ni such as pNi = max (pN1, pN2,
pN3)
II N1 if PN1 >PN3, N3 otherwise N1 if pN1 > pN3, N3 otherwise
III N3 N3
Table 10
equilibrium solution Ni (i = 1, 2, 3).
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tions when more than two games are feasible (regions I and II).Region Manufacturer Retailer Channel
I N3 N3 N3
II
N1  N3, d1 2
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
8þd428d22
1d22
r
;2
 
N1  N3,d1 2
(x15, x16)
N1  N3,d1 2
(x17, x18)
III N3 N3 N35.2. Effect of sequence of move of price and marketing effort decisions
Proposition 10. When the channel does not have a leader, equilib-
rium solutions in N1 and N3 in the feasible domain (I and II) compare
as follows;PN3 < PN1 , d1 >
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
8þ d42  8d22
1 d22
vuut ;
pN3 < pN1 , d1 2 ðx15; x16Þ; CN3 < CN1 , d1 2 ðx17; x18Þ;
wN3 < wN1; pN3 < pN1; ðpN3 wN3Þ < ðpN1 wN1Þ;
mN3 < mN1; rN3 < rN1; qN3 > qN1 , d1 <
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
4 d22
q
;
where x15 to x18 are functions of d2, and are included in Appendix 2.
These results indicate that, whenever channel members can
choose between N1 and N3, the simultaneous decision making of
pricing and marketing mix strategies in N1 would yield higher
wholesale and retail prices and marketing efforts at equilibrium
as well as higher margins. Since both ME and prices are higher in
N1 than in N3, demand obtained in N1 is expanded by the addi-
tional ME but reduced by the higher price. These opposite effects
on demand can lead to higher or lower demand in N1 than in N3
depending on market conditions. Consequently, for both channel
members, N1 is associated with higher proﬁt margins, but higher
ME costs than N3. Hence, comparison of proﬁts obtained in N1
and N3 would ultimately depend on the associated revenues in
each scenario.
Further analysis of the effects on proﬁts and demands is ex-
plored by looking at the feasible region (I).
Corollary 5. When the channel does not have a leader, equilibrium
retail and total channel proﬁts in N1 and N3 in the feasible domain (I)
compare as follows;PN3 > PN1; pN3 > pN1; qN3 > qN1; CN3 > CN1:
Both the manufacturer and the retailer prefer N3 to N1 in the
feasible domain (I). Although N1 provides both channel members
with higher proﬁt margins, the demand is lower than in N3. This
is because the consumer price is higher in this scenario. While
channel members invest in more marketing efforts in N1 than in
N3, the demand expansion due to the additional ME is not sufﬁ-
cient to counter the lost unit sales due to a higher price. The MEFig. 13. Optimal sequencosts are also higher in N1, which ultimately results in lower prof-
its in N1 than in N3. It follows that higher overall channel proﬁt is
achieved at equilibrium by playing the sequence of move N3 (ME,
then prices) instead of N1 in this region of the parameters domain.
Since channel members can also play the sequence of move N2
in the feasible domain (I), we now compare N2 and N3 in order to
determine which scenario represents the optimal sequence of
move for each channel member.
Proposition 11. When the channel does not have a leader, equilib-
rium solutions in N2 and N3 in the feasible domain (I) compare as
follows;
PN3 > PN2; pN3 > pN2; CR3 > CR2;
wN3 < wN2; pN3 < pN2; ðpN3 wN3Þ > ðpN2 wN2Þ;
mN3 < mN2; rN3 > rN2; qN3 > qN2:
Proposition 11 shows that, in the feasible domain (I), N3 is pre-
ferred to N2 by both channel members. This is mainly because N3
provides higher unit sales at equilibrium than N2. It also provides
higher revenues to the retailer given that its proﬁt margin is higher
in N3 than in N2. While the retail ME costs are higher in N3, the
increase in revenues compensates for the additional costs and
overall proﬁt is higher in N3. Next, we now summarize the results
for the three Ni games.Corollary 6. When the channel does not have a leader, the preferred
game by each channel member and by the entire channel is given in
Table 10
Corollary 6 indicates that the sequence of play N2 is not an opti-
mal scenario in a channel where the retailer and the manufacturer
make each of their marketing mix decisions simultaneously. The
channel members would prefer to decide of their marketing efforts
and prices in separate periods only if prices are decided after ME
(N3).
Fig. 13 shows the optimal sequence of move for each channel
member and for the entire channel. As we can see, N3 is preferred
by both the manufacturer and the retailer in most of the feasiblece of move for Ni.
646 S. Karray / European Journal of Operational Research 228 (2013) 635–647domain. Further, the simultaneous sequence of move of both pric-
ing and ME (herein N1), which has been commonly used in the lit-
erature, is optimal for channel members and for the entire channel
in restricted regions of the parameters domain. Comparison of do-
main regions where N1 is preferred by both channel members
(Fig. 13) shows that conﬂicted choices of optimal sequences of
move can arise for certain levels of d1 and d2. For example, in case
of low levels of d1, the manufacturer might prefer to decide of all of
its marketing mix elements (prices and ME) simultaneously with
the retailer, while the retailer would rather decide of ME and prices
at different periods. Conﬂicted choices of N1 and N3 are also no-
ticed for high levels of both d1 and d2.
Looking at the optimal sequence of move for the total channel,
this conﬂict can be alleviated if channel members agree on adopt-
ing the sequence of move that yields maximum proﬁts for the en-
tire channel. As we can see in Fig. 13, conﬂict can be solved if the
manufacturer switches to the retailer’s preferred sequence of move
(e.g., for low levels of d1 or high levels of both d1 and d2). Interest-
ingly, in certain regions of the domain (low d2 and medium d1),
both channel members can individually prefer the same sequence
of move (N1). However, a different sequence of move (N3) would
yield the maximum channel proﬁts.6. Summary and conclusions
This paper investigates the implications of different periodicity
(sequence of move) for pricing and marketing efforts decision-
making in a bilateral distribution channel. Results from our
game-theoretic model show that which sequence of move for price
and ME is optimal would depend on the ME effectiveness levels of
the manufacturer and the retailer and on channel leadership.
When the manufacturer or the retailer lead the channel, our
ﬁndings suggest that while the choice of the optimal sequence of
move for speciﬁc ME effectiveness levels depends on which ﬁrm
is the leader, the results from both leadership scenarios are quali-
tatively similar.
Regardless of which is the channel leader, we ﬁnd that the se-
quence in which prices and ME are chosen signiﬁcantly impacts
the equilibrium strategies and proﬁts. In fact, sequential deci-
sion-making of pricing and ME allows channel members to imple-
ment optimal strategies and obtain maximum proﬁts for high
levels of ME effects. In particular, for the highest levels of the
retailer’s ME effects, the only feasible sequence of move for
channel members is to decide on ME before prices. However,
games characterized by the highest levels of the manufacturer’s
ME effects are only feasible if prices preceded the ME decisions.
When channel members can choose between different sequences
of play of ME and prices, we ﬁnd that the channel leader should
decide of prices ﬁrst in situations characterized by highly effective
retailer’s marketing efforts.
Further, the channel leader would prefer to decide simulta-
neously of pricing and ME only in a small region of the parameters
domain especially for high enough levels of the manufacturer’s ME
effects. This highlights the importance of relaxing the simulta-
neous play assumption of pricing and ME which has been widely
used in the coop advertising literature. In particular, the leader
can choose a more proﬁtable sequence of move when the retailer’s
ME are more effective than manufacturer’s, and lead the channel
considering less restrictive assumptions on the ME effectiveness
levels. In fact, for very highly effective marketing efforts, sequential
play of pricing and ME allows channel members to implement
equilibrium strategies and therefore achieve maximum proﬁts that
would not be achieved with simultaneous decision-making.
Our ﬁndings also indicate that the channel leader can often
beneﬁt from implementing a sequence of move that would notmaximize its proﬁts but could extract additional channel proﬁts in-
stead. This not only allows conﬂict resolution with the following
channel member, when the latter prefers a different sequence of
move, but could also beneﬁt the leader after redistribution of addi-
tional channel proﬁts. However, in some instances channel conﬂict
would persist, in which case the follower will assume the opportu-
nity cost of not choosing its favorite sequence of move.
For the case of power symmetry in the channel, we ﬁnd that
channel members could prefer to decide of their marketing mix
strategies at the same period, as conventionally assumed in the
existing literature. However, such preference applies mainly for
high levels of the manufacturer’s ME effects. In other cases; e.g.,
when both channel members use highly effective marketing efforts
or when the retailer’s ME are more effective than the manufac-
turer’s ME, channel members are better off implementing a
sequential decision-making approach for marketing efforts and
prices where prices are decided in a later period than ME. In con-
trast to the situations where the manufacturer or the retailer are
channel leaders, when channel members choose each element of
their marketing mix simultaneously, it is not optimal, in any case
to decide of prices prior to ME.
These results have many useful implications for managers in
the distribution channel ﬁeld. They highlight the importance of
accounting for the periodicity of marketing mix decisions in the
channel and its implications for strategic decisions and proﬁts. In
particular, our ﬁndings indicate that the periodicity of these deci-
sions should be determined, and sometimes negotiated, by channel
members in order to achieve maximum proﬁts. Further, these mar-
keting mix decisions should be renegotiated for varying levels of
marketing efforts effectiveness and vertical interaction scenarios
in the channel.
This paper offers also a theoretic contribution to the cooperative
advertising literature. Since ﬁrms are considered rational players,
the simultaneous decision-making assumption does not always
represent the channel members’ optimal choice. The results show
that allowing for alternative sequences of move for pricing and
ME decisions can lead to alternative equilibrium levels at equilib-
rium, which can inﬂuence cooperative advertising programs agree-
ments and negotiations in the channel.
Future research can extend our results by replicating our anal-
ysis; e.g., by considering a different model speciﬁcation (e.g., a
multiplicative demand function as in Xie and Neyret, 2009) or by
allowing for a portfolio of ME activities by the manufacturer and
the retailer. Further, the results in this paper can help the leader
whether to decide on price and marketing efforts at separate peri-
ods or to lead in all of these decisions at once. We choose the se-
quences of move in the paper in order to focus on the impact of
different periodicity of marketing efforts and pricing decisions as
opposed to the commonly assumed simultaneous decision-making
approach. It is important to reiterate that the vertical interaction
scenarios considered in the paper were chosen because of their
common use in the marketing and OR literature. It is not the pa-
per’s purpose to investigate the problem of which channel leader-
ship is appropriate in which situation. For example, in considering
the case in which the retailer acts as a Stackelberg leader in both
the pricing and the marketing effort games, the paper conforms
to the existing literature by considering as exogenous the reasons
that enable a retailer to precommit to a certain retail price and
marketing efforts. An extension of the paper can endogenize the
channel leadership position and study which channel member
should be the leader, and for which element of the marketing
mix. For example, while we considered the case of full leadership
in the channel (the leader moves ﬁrst for both prices and market-
ing efforts), future research could explore mixed leadership scenar-
ios where each ﬁrm could lead the channel in one decision only
(Stern and El-Ansary, 1992). The channel members could also
S. Karray / European Journal of Operational Research 228 (2013) 635–647 647make certain pricing and marketing effort decisions (e.g., retail
price and feature promotion) at the same time and make other
decisions in other periods. In this case, exploring the situation
where there is no clear separation in the timing of price and
marketing effort decisions could also be of interest for future
researchers.
Finally, empirical research is needed to identify how ﬁrms in
different industries determine their pricing and marketing efforts
and which factors inﬂuence the periodicity of such decisions.Appendix A. Supplementary material
Supplementary data associated with this article can be found, in
the online version, at http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ejor.2013.02.012.References
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